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Rezumat: România pe agenda diplomatică și de planificare a Marii Britanii și SUA 
pe parcursul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial (1940-1944) 
Cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial a fost probabil cel mai important eveniment care a 
marcat lumea în secolul anterior. Fără îndoială el a condus la o schimbare a felului în care 
analizăm  şi interpretăm relaţiile internaţionale deoarece a adus în discuţie un nou statut de 
forţă la nivel global: superputerea. Încă din timpul războiului a devenit evident faptul că noua 
lume de la sfârşitul conflictului va fi dominată de către S.U.A  şi de către Uniunea Sovietică. 
În ceea ce priveşte subiectul de faţă – România  şi relaţiile ei cu Vestul, apropierea geografică 
de  Rusia  a  rămas  un  factor  determinant.  Modul  în care Marea  Britanie    şi  partenerul  ei 
evident mai puternic, S.U.A., vedeau România în perioada tulbure a războiului era puternic 
influenţată de U.R.S.S. Acest adevăr a rămas neschimbat în ciuda existenţei unor elemente 
care ar sugera contrariul. Britanicii, în mod special, au început să considere România ca un 
potenţial câmp de luptă  şi nu au ignorat importanţa ei strategică atunci când au declanşat 
procedurile de planificare postbelică. Această lucrare are ca scop analizarea locului ocupat 
de către România în calculele  şi planurile aliate, mai ales cele care includeau o imagine mai 
largă care să cuprindă  şi Uniunea Sovietică. 
 
Abstract: The Second World War was arguably the most important event that shaped 
the world in the last century. Without a doubt it marked a significant change in the way we see 
and interpret international relations because it brought into question a new word a status of 
strength:  the  superpowers.  Even  during  the  war  it  became  apparent  that  the  new  world 
emerging from the conflict will be dominated by the U.S.A and the Soviet Union. For the 
subject at hand here – Romania and its relations with the West at the time, Russian vicinity is 
a very determining factor. The way Britain and its bigger partner, the U.S. viewed Romania 
during  those  troubled  years  was  unquestionably  altered  by  Russian  influence.  This  fact 
remained  unchanged,  even  though  there  were  some  elements  that  may  suggest  otherwise. 
Especially the British started to think of Romania as a future battlefield and didn’t ignore its 
strategic importance when they started postwar planning procedures. This paper focuses on 
the place occupied by Romania in the Allied plans and predictions, especially in the bigger of 
picture, which included the Soviet Union. 
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Résumé: La Roumanie sur la diplomatique agenda et planification de la Grande-
Bretagne et les États-Unis pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (1940-1944) 
La Deuxième Guerre mondiale a été sans doute l'événement le plus important qui a 
façonné le monde dans le siècle dernier. Sans doute, il a marqué un changement important 
dans la façon dont nous voyons et interprétons les relations internationales, parce qu'il met en 
question un nouveau mot, un statut de force: les superpuissances. Même pendant la guerre, il 
est devenu évident que le nouveau monde en émergence de ce conflit sera dominée par les 
Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Pour le sujet en question - la Roumanie et ses relations avec 
l'Occident, la proximité de Russie est un facteur très déterminant. La façon dont la Grande-
Bretagne  et  les  Etats-Unis  vu  la  Roumanie,  au  cours  de  ces  années  troublées,  a  été 
incontestablement altéré par l'influence russe. Ce fait resté inchangé, bien qu'il y eût certains 
éléments qui peuvent suggérer le contraire. En particulier, le Royaume-Uni a commencé à 
penser de la Roumanie comme un futur champ de bataille. Et ne pas ignorer son importance 
stratégique  quand ils  ont  commencé  les  procédures  de  planification  de l'après-guerre. Ce 
document  se  concentre  sur  la  place  occupée  par  la  Roumanie  dans  cette  plans  et  les 
prévisions connexes, plans qui comprenaient l'Union soviétique aussi. 
 
Keywords:  postwar,  diplomacy,  strategic,  Romania,  Great  Britain,  United  States, 
influence. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After the unexpected fall of France in the summer of 1940, both London and 
Washington  were forced to change their policies regarding  Eastern Europe,  which 
seemed likely to be the new sector where Germany will focus its attention. Indeed, 
the  rapid  surrender  of  France  changed  many  plans  including  Stalin’s.  The  Soviet 
dictator  gambled  on  a  prolonged  conflict  between  the  Western  capitalist  powers, 
which  would  allow  him  the  much  needed  time  to  build  up  his  armed  forces.  For 
Romania, the fall of its most important ally was close to a national disaster. The new 
Romanian  leader,  General  Antonescu  had  assumed  power  after  the  catastrophic 
events in the summer of 1940, when Romania was forced to give in to the U.S.S.R., 
Hungary and Bulgaria significant parts of its territory. Antonescu was first mentioned 
as a potential candidate for power during these same negotiations with Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarian foreign minister made it clear to the American diplomats that Antonescu 
was tied to Germany and was expected to follow it in the near future. Consequently, 
the  American  minister  in  Bucharest,  Franklin  Mott  Gunther,  transmitted  similar 
information regarding Antonescu’s trust relations with high ranking Reich officials. 
However, Gunther believed that the general was mistaken if he put too much trust 
into  the  German  territorial  guarantees
1.  Therefore,  after  the  announcement  of  the 
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founding of the new national-legionary state and Romania’s adherence to the Axis, its 
relations  with  the  U.S.  declined  significantly.  They  will  culminate  with  the 
announcement  of  the  state  of  war  between  the  two  countries  one  year  later. 
Romania’s diplomatic relations  with  Britain followed a similar pattern, but with a 
more dramatic curve towards open conflict. Under Antonescu Romania was forced to 
take  much  more  radical  steps  against  Britain  since  it  was  fighting  a  war  with 
Romania’s  ally,  Germany.  They  will  climax  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  British 
mission  in Romania. One important crisis occurred at the end of September 1940, 
soon after Antonescu assumed power. Britain accused Romania of kidnapping and 
hurting  British  citizens  under  the  claim  they  were  secrets  agents.  British  foreign 
Minister, Lord Halifax, protested vehemently against these abuses and warned Radu 
Florescu, the Romanian charge in London, that if these acts of abuse continued, the 
British  Government  will  have  to  assume  they  are  made  with  the  approval  of  the 
Romanian government
2.  
 
A CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Until the launch of Operation Barbarossa – the invasion of the Soviet Union 
by Germany and its allies, Romania’s relations with the U.S. and Britain were almost 
on the same coordinates. During a statement by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 
before  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  from  the  House  of  Representatives  on 
January 15, 1941, the American official made a resume of his country’s diplomatic 
efforts  to  avert  war  in  the  last  couple  of  years.  He  supported  Lend-Lease  as  an 
integrant part of American security policy and furthermore, he made a presentation of 
Germany and  Italy aggressive acts that had lead to war. What is more significant, 
Hull made some remarks on Romania:  
“[…]  The  period  of  the  war  has  witnessed  the  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Denmark,  Norway,  Holland,  Belgium,  and  Luxemburg,  in  violation  of  the 
scrupulously observed neutrality of these countries and in contravention, in the cases 
of some of these countries, of assurances expressly given by Germany of her intention 
to respect their independence and sovereignty; the invasion and partial occupation of 
France;  the  splitting  up  of  Rumania  and  the  German  occupation  of  the  remaining 
portion of that country […]”
3. 
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If we take into account the reports sent by the American mission in Bucharest 
we can safely assume that, as far as the Department of State was concerned, Romania 
was  now  clearly  in  the  German  sphere  of  influence.  This  was  proven  by  her 
adherence to the Axis, as well as by the entrance of German occupying forces into the 
country. Gunther informed Washington that Romania was negotiating with Germany 
and  Italy for  military assistance and training, and that  meant the presence of Axis 
(German) forces in Romania. Rumours begin to circulate in the diplomatic circles that 
German air and land instructors were entering Romania in October 1940. They were 
housed around Bucharest and some other strategic areas: 
“[…]  the  Rumanian  General  Staff  and  the  German  Military  Attaché  state 
categorically that no German troops or equipment have entered Rumania. The latter 
adds  however  that  negotiations  between  the  Rumanian,  German  and  Italian 
Governments with a view to supplying Rumania with instructors and training cadres 
have been going on for some time and will probably be successfully concluded at an 
early date […]”
4. 
As for Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill did not hesitate to announce 
his opinion that Romania was clearly on German side, even before it had adhered to 
the Axis. In a message to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he makes clear that he 
intends to take punitive actions against Romania: 
“Now that the Roumanian Government is helping themselves to the property of 
British subjects, ought we not show the Roumanians that we shall use their frozen 
fund to compensate our people? I understand that about six weeks ago you blocked 
Roumanian assets in London. We have been treated odiously by these people”
5. There 
were however some other British opinions on Romania, originating mainly from the 
Foreign Office. They tended to analyze Romania’s actions in the context of the much 
larger  picture  of  Eastern  Europe.  For  British  interests  Turkey  played  a significant 
role.  But  the  Empire’s  resources  were  dwindling  and  its  options  were  limited, 
especially the military ones. Also, British prestige was at its lowest after Dunquerque. 
There was the ever growing prospect of Turkey falling into the arms of Germany, as 
did Romania in response to Soviet pressure. This made Britain examine her options in 
Eastern Europe in the early months of 1941. The press published a series of articles 
about  Romania’s  departure  from  the  Balkan  Entente  and  the  dangers  this  move 
presented  for  the  security  of  Turkey  and  consequently  the  Suez  channel
6.  The 
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entrance of German troops into Romania was also a warning sign for London. Britain 
followed the standard policy in this case and declared that Romania was an occupied 
country.  Hoare  protested  repeatedly  against  this  seeming  violation  of  Romania’s 
neutrality and reported back to London the alarming numbers of German soldiers in 
the country. Considering this act as an obstruction of normal diplomatic activity in a 
neutral country, Hoare obtained permission from the Foreign Office to severe British 
relations with  Romania. The British legation  moved to Istanbul, but Hoare  himself 
stayed  in  Bucharest  a  little  longer.  He  conveyed  with  major  Ratay,  the  American 
military  attaché,  and  both  of  them  concluded  that  German  forces  in  Romania 
exceeded earlier numbers. Ratay even suggested that almost 10.000 German soldiers 
were entering Romania every day, which made the total German forces about 15 to 20 
divisions strong
7. 
After  that  the  Romanian  government,  at  the  request  of  Germany,  restricted 
British and American diplomatic travels in the country and had their legacies under 
constant  watch.  Romanian  citizens  who  were  meeting  with  American  or  British 
diplomats  were  under  surveillance.  This  made  Hoare  tell  Antonescu  that  “his 
Majesty’s  Government  decided  to  recall  him”  because  “the  Germans  were  using 
Romania as a military base”
8. British interests in Romania would be represented by 
the American embassy. Romania retaliated to this action by withdrawing the Viorel 
Tilea led mission in London on February 23 1941. Romania also cancelled all of its 
oil shipments to Turkey, since they were sold to Britain
9. 
The Foreign Office and C.O.S.-the British Chiefs of Staff, both misinterpreted 
the build-up of German military forces in Romania. The arrival of Wehrmacht troops 
in Romania, which continued throughout the winter of 1940,  was considered to be 
based on Germany’s desire to have a strong presence in the area. British analysts also 
thought that these forces were meant to allow Germany leverage in the eventuality of 
talks with Turkey
10. Even Churchill clearly states in his memoirs that in the autumn of 
1940 London didn’t have a clear picture of the Balkan area. British secret services 
could  only  detect  a  significant  German  build-up  in  this  region
11.  Germany’s 
objectives, that is, her next target, could not be identified at that time. Coincidentally, 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary made a quick working trip in the region 
at that time. This  gave Adolf Hitler a reason for pause and a pretext for invading 
Greece in the spring of 1941. The entire British diplomatically construction in the 
Balkan area collapsed after that, although it is safe to say London didn’t have great 
                                                           
7 Gheorghe Buzatu, op.cit., p. 65. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s forgotten ally: Ion Antonescu and his regime, Romania 1940–44, 
New York, Palgrave  MacMillan, 2006, p. 75. 
10 Nicholas Tamkin, op.cit., p. 34. 
11 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. II, p. 524. 292  Dan Dragoş Sichigea 
expectation to begin  with; it all came down to  military strength and  Britain didn’t 
have  resources  except  those  committed  in  Greece.  Although  Under-Secretary 
Alexander Cadogan had expressed doubts that Yugoslavia and Greece would put up a 
fight
12, they actually opposed Hitler with arms, even if to no avail.  
The concentration of German forces and equipment in Romania was also the 
focus  of  several  diplomatic  telegrams  sent  back  to  Washington  by  the  American 
legation in Bucharest. Gunther made a very accurate assessment about the numbers of 
German soldiers in the country – roughly about 100.000. Yet, much like his British 
counterparts, he didn’t see any long term goal for Germany’s presence in Romania. 
He  thought  that  the  German  policy  was  “purely  opportunist,  preventive  and 
mandatory”.  He  added  that  “Germany  just  wishes  to  be  prepared  for  all 
contingencies”.  The  similarity  between  his  point  of  view  and  those  of  British 
diplomats is striking: 
“[…]  the  great  bulk  of  the  German  troops  at  both  places  have  been  sent  – 
possibly amounting to over 25,000 – have been sent south to Giurgiu, Oltenita and 
other bridgeheads on the Danube where they face Bulgaria with pontoon and bridge 
equipment […] It would therefore seem full pressure is mobilized to impress Filoff
13 
during his Vienna visit […] Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are, however, in for a period of 
peaceful  bullying  and  I  wonder  whether  it  is  not  time  for  a  few  words  of  direct 
encouragement.  This  however,  to  be  effective  should  be  backed  with  British 
assurance of real aid”
14.  
So  although  the  Department  of  State  was  well  informed  of  Romania’s 
increasing  diplomatic  isolation  and  of  the  German  penetration  in  the  region, 
Gunther’s efforts were rebuked by Washington. His conclusions were irrefutable – 
the new Romanian Prime-Minister, Ion Gigurtu will steer Romania towards Germany 
and the Axis; as for the Foreign Office, even official documents speak of the absence 
of any other choice for Romania given that Germany dominated Europe in the autumn 
of 1940: 
“When called upon to form a government in September 1940, Antonescu made 
the  King’s  abdication  a  condition,  and  having  secured  that,  faced  the  task  of 
governing the country in the face of a German menace of occupation with the people 
incensed at the loss of territory, with the new King only 18 years of age, and with the 
Iron Guard ready and anxious to make trouble … As regards the German occupation, 
the  only  question  was  whether  this  should  take  place  with  or  without  consent. 
Although  Antonescu  had  always  been  pro-British  in  sympathy,  he  decided  that  it 
would be better for the country not to be occupied by an openly hostile force. His 
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decision has been severely criticized, but in view of the impossibility of obtaining 
help from the Allies, it is hard to see what else he could have done”
15. 
This  alignment  of  Romania  with  Germany’s  new  order  in  Europe  was 
therefore, understood up to a point by Britain and by the U.S. At the same time event 
were on the rise again in Eastern Europe with the Fuhrer at their centre stage. His 
decision to attack the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, altered the course of the 
war, and brought Romania furthermore under the scope of Washington and London 
based analysts. The main reason for it was that Romania was the largest contributor to 
the German war effort among her satellite allies. Antonescu was the only allied leader 
warned by Hitler of the impending onslaught unleashed on the Soviets.  
At that point, the U.S. Minister in Bucharest was involved in a massive analysis 
for the Department of State and for the President with the aim of „clearing the fog” 
around the German military presence in Romania. It was clear that, since the German 
build-up of forces exceeded the  needs of the campaign in the Balkans,  Berlin  had 
further  goals  in  the  area.  Gunther  made  some  predictions  about  the  developments 
which we feel were interesting: 
„[...]  Inasmuch  as  war  between  Germany  and  Russia  is  being  increasingly 
discussed in this part of the world I have endeavoured to analyze from this angle the 
chances for and against such a conflict [...] Russia is daily getting stronger military 
and economically and according to some good  military opinion  will be fairly  well 
organized in 2 years [...] There is at work adroit pressure from General Antonescu and 
his  Government  to  the  end  that  Hitler  should  not  play  second  fiddle  to  Stalin  in 
Russian occupied Rumania or condone the latter’s continued threats to the mouth of 
the Danube [...] It would seem that the balance tips if favour of an early war between 
Germany and Russia [...]”
16. 
Even after June 22 1941 Gunther  had intensified  his working  meetings with 
contacts in the Romanian government, despite the fact that the U.S. had arranged war 
shipments  for  the  Soviets.  During  his  discussions  with  Mihai  Antonescu,  the  new 
Romanian Foreign Minister, and with general Antonescu, Gunther was able to form a 
clearer picture of the front for  his superiors in  Washington.  He did promise to M. 
Antonescu that the Romanian point of view would be made known to the Department 
of  State  and  vice  versa
17.  Gunther  made  significant  efforts  to  change  America’s 
perception that Romania was an occupied country. This was even more pressing since 
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the U.S. had decided to freeze all Romanian assets, which made the Romanian charge 
in Washington to say that America was no longer neutral in the war
18.  
The invasion of the Soviet Union was a pivotal event for the way U.S.A. and 
Britain  regarded  Romania,  now  involved  military  as  an  ally  of  Germany  in  war. 
Churchill had warned in London in a radio cast on February 9 1941 that Germany had 
major interests in the Black Sea region now that it had managed to occupy Romania 
and  Hungary
19.  British  and  American  interest  for  Eastern  Europe  took  a  sharp 
increase after June 22 1941, when the Romanian Army helped liberate Bessarabia and 
northern Bukovina. British press noted through The Times that Romanians supported 
the campaign against the Soviet Union, although the alliance with Germany was more 
of a necessary evil
20. From his post in the capital of Romania, Gunther made similar 
remarks as he remembered a discussion with general Antonescu: 
“[…] Nevertheless, it has always been my impression – one which has recently 
been confirmed by the General’s pro-German as well as his anti-British feelings are 
not dictated b sentiment but solely by what he considered to be national interests and 
date from Russia’s incursion into Rumania and the collapse of France […]”
21. 
The Romanian government however made significant efforts to persuade both 
Britain and U.S.A. that its participation in the war against the Soviets was the just 
thing to do. Trough discussions with opposition members – Iuliu Maniu in particular 
– Gunther was able to understand and relay back home the difficult position in which 
Romania found itself. Alexandru Cretzianu notes that that the American minister “did 
everything  humanly  possible  to  achieve  some  measure  of  understanding  so  that 
America  would  not think of us as German partners”
22. Gunther pressed further by 
asking  the  Department  of  State  to  issue  a  statement  in  which  it  would  express 
sympathy for the war of freedom these small states – Romania and Finland – were 
forced to fight against the U.S.S.R. He noted his sorrow that the Romanian people 
thought America was on the side of the Soviets. For that same reason he believed it 
was necessary that the U.S. clarify its position regarding this conflict
23. 
On  July  25  1941,  the  Department  of  State  declined  Gunther’s  requests  and 
reminded  him  of  Undersecretary  Summer  Well’s  statement  a  day  after  Germany 
attacked Russia. In it was the only position the U.S. government would take for the 
time being. America’s view of the war in Europe was well detailed: 
“[…] But the immediate issue that presents itself to the people of the United 
States is whether the plan for universal conquest, for the cruel and brutal enslavement 
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of all peoples, and for the ultimate destruction of the remaining free democracies, 
which Hitler is now desperately trying to carry out, is to be successfully halted and 
defeated  […]  the  opinion  of  this  Government,  consequently,  any  defence  against 
Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these 
forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, 
and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defence and security. Hitler's 
armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas”
24. Unfortunately for the future of 
mutual relations, this  meant that the Department of  State remained rigid  regarding 
Romania. Still, the Americans were  willing to  wait some time before taking  more 
drastic  measures.  There  is  proof  for  that  in  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  didn’t  reply 
immediately to Romania’s declaration of war. Instead there was hope in Washington 
that ignoring this declaration will not inflate the situation and will allow time for the 
opposition  in  Bucharest  to  remove  Romania  from  the  Axis.  For  the  moment  the 
Department of State choose to maintain relations and, more significantly, promised 
via Gunther that if the American government should at some point consider important 
to change its position, it would take into consideration Romania and Finland
25. 
One important person that worked to ensure Romania and the Saxon powers 
are maintaining close relations was Mihai Antonescu. The Foreign Minister was keen 
American  and  British  officials  know  the  Romanian  side  of  the  story  concerning 
military  operations  against  the  Soviet  Union.  Immediately  after  Romanian  troops 
liberated Bessarabia and proceeded to the siege of Odessa, he sent instructions so that 
the Romanian legation in Washington could explain with clarity the objectives that 
Romania pursues beyond the Dniester. At that time it was understood that it would 
limit  its  participation  at  a  defensive  posture  along  the  banks  of  that  river
26.  The 
Department of State was to be informed that Romania’s only goal in the war was the 
retrieval of the robbed territories in 1940. Any incursion beyond the river was purely 
military motivated
27. Here was an attempt by the Romanian government to convince 
America that crossing the Dniester was a military decision and was no based on any 
desire of territorial expansion. 
On the 1
st of July 1941, Iuliu Maniu, head of National Peasants’ Party, had a 
talk with Gunther. The Romanian politician expressed his concerns over the crossing 
of the Dniester and informed the American diplomat that he had asked Antonescu to 
withdraw the troops back to the river, even though he wasn’t sure Hitler would allow 
such  a  daring  move.  For  Gunther  though  the  main  issue  was  the  diminishing 
sympathy of the Romanian people for American and for Britain. The cause of this, he 
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felt,  was  the  unwavering  support  these  countries  had  shown  to  the  cause  of  the 
Soviets, with which Romania was at war. Most of the Romanians were hoping for an 
Allied victory, but not a Soviet one. It was puzzling for them as to why the U.S. was 
backing the U.S.S.R. and there was cause for concern about the treatment in store for 
Romania at the future peace conference
28. 
We can conclude that even though the official position the  U.S. and  British 
governments was quite reserved on the matter of Romania’s participation on the war 
with the Soviet Union, the media from these countries had already labelled Romania 
as an enemy state. The Romanian politicians made significant efforts to prevent this, 
but  to  no  avail.  For  the  U.S.  in  particular,  the  fact  that  Romania  had  given  in  to 
Germany’s demands so easily, with no fight, was a tale tell sign and made quite a 
terrible impression for the common American, especially when Finland or Yugoslavia 
tried heroically to stave the German onslaught
29. 
The German attack of the U.S.S.R. had the immediate effect of alleviating the 
position of Britain in the war. At a time when the military situation seemed desperate, 
the news from Russia was welcomed at London. Still, this attack came as a surprise 
for Britain, as for the entire world. Even though British intelligence was aware of the 
„concentration of important German forces in Eastern Europe”, an attack on Russia 
was „too good to be true”.
30 From conversations at the Foreign Office and the Army 
we know that all of these institutions harboured a natural distrust of Russia’s goals 
and plans. The Chiefs of Staff noted that the best course of action was to avoid any 
official understanding with the Soviet Union regarding territorial changes until after 
the  conclusion  of  the  war
31.  Yet  almost  immediately  after  the  German  attack, 
Churchill open a channel of communication  with the  Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin, 
which would go on for the whole war. It was necessary to harmonize the relations and 
put together the  military plans if Nazi Germany  was to be defeated. Through this 
personal  channel  of  communication  Stalin  made  his  partner  aware  that  the  Soviet 
Union desired a clarification of both partners’ intentions in the war. In his telegram on 
September 3 1941 Stalin clearly states that the balance of  forces on the front was 
broken because Germany had aid from Romania. Because of this the U.S.S.R. was 
forced to evacuate Western Ukraine
32. Consequently, to the increasing demands of 
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materials and war equipment he soon added the additional request that Britain and the 
Soviet Union should reach and arrangement regarding territorial clauses during the 
war, as opposed to after it. He also wanted that Britain would immediately declare 
war on Romania and Finland. As Churchill notes in his great book, this requests mark 
one of the toughest chapter in British-Soviet negotiations during the war. 
The fate of Romania in the context of British-Soviet talks (soon the U.S. would 
join them too) rested on Moscow’s ability to convince its partners of the necessity to 
declare  war  on  Germany’s  minor  partners.  British  and  American  plans  and 
projections  had  to  navigate  Stalin’s  increasingly  bigger  plans  for  Eastern  Europe. 
London and Washington had to find a way to balance the Soviet Union’s fair desire 
for  security  and  the  fears  that  it  may  overrun  the  whole  region.  During  these 
negotiations,  Romania played a central part. As 1941 was closing, Soviet  Russia’s 
pressure on its partners increased dramatically and was two folded: the recognition of 
the borders as they stood in 1940, and the declaration of war on Romania. Those were 
Stalin’s main concerns regarding Romania.  
 
THE SOVIET FACTOR BECOMES DOMINANT 
 
Until August 3 1941 Romania benefited from U.S. and British sympathy. Its 
struggle with the Soviets was seen as a just fight to take back its territories. Romanian 
diplomacy managed on some levels to present this position with moderate success. 
Hull  had  shown  sympathy  towards  the  retrieval  of  Bessarabia  and  Northern 
Bukovina. As for Churchill, he had clearly stated that the annexations of 1940 were 
made by force. Britain could not applaud Romania’s contribution on the Nazi  war 
effort, but it would not condemn it either. After August 3 however, the situation was 
modified.  The  Foreign  Office  protested  immediately  after  Romanian  troops  had 
passed the Dniester. The Romanian Army was conducting military operations deep 
into Soviet territory and Britain had no choice but to criticize this act. Because of this 
and of increasing Russian pressure, Britain began to back down on its issue of the war 
declaration
33.  
When the British and the American missions lead by Lord Beaverbrook and 
Averell  Harriman  respectively,  began  talks  with  the  Soviets,  Stalin  showed  his 
interest for a declaration of common  goals in the  war. He did  not believe that the 
Atlantic Charter held all that Britain and America hoped to achieve. For the U.S.S.R. 
the Charter was vague and didn’t touch important subjects such as war reparations. 
Beaverbrook  even  had  the  feeling  that  Stalin  wanted  to  turn  the  war-limited 
agreement into a full-fledged alliance that would satisfy the long-term objectives of 
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both Soviet Russia and Great Britain
34. What Stalin basically wanted was: 1) Britain 
to declare war on Finland and Romania; 2) the recognition of the borders prior to June 
22 1941 – that  meant that the  Baltic States, Bessarabia, Eastern Poland would be 
given back to the U.S.S.R. Without these concessions he could not see a future for the 
alliance against Germany. Over the coming months his demands became increasingly 
fervent and he even went so far as to say that without them there could be no mutual 
trust between the Soviet  Union and Britain.  In  his  message for the British Prime-
Minister on the 8
th of November, Stalin noted that the Soviet demands had somehow 
reached the press and claimed that this could be used to weaken the Russian-British 
relations in the future
35. For the moment however, Churchill wasn’t prepared to be 
forced  in  this  matter.  He  believed  that  a  war  declaration  would  just  silence  those 
voices in Romania and Finland that opposed the war with Russia. In this matter he 
and  the  Americans  were  seeing  “eye  to  eye”.  Still,  he  announced  that,  if  these 
countries  would  not  stop  the  support  they  are  giving  to  the  Nazi  war  effort  by 
December  7,  he  would  have  to  make  the  final  step  of  declaring  the  state  of  war. 
Furthermore, he would send Anthony Eden to Moscow to discuss these issues with 
Stalin. For territorial matter however, the British government  was quite clear: they 
would not be discussed until Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the U.S.A. would sit 
together at the “conference table as equal partners in the struggle against Nazism”
36. 
Thus Antony Eden travelled to the Soviet capital convinced that his task was 
quite  difficult.  His  prerogatives  were  limited  and  he  was  to  sign  no  treaty  that 
included territorial clauses. Yet he personally believed that a soviet victory in the war, 
as unlikely as it seemed at that time,  would  make  Stalin  want to impose  his own 
borders in Eastern Europe. For that reason he had recommended to the War Cabined 
to reach a full agreement with the Soviets as early as possible so as to use it to 
limit  communist  expansion  after  the  war.  He  would  openly  say  a  few  months 
after, in February of 1942, that any German defeat in that year could only happen 
on  the  Eastern  front;  Britain,  even  with  the  help  of  the  Americans,  could  not 
mount any significant invasion of Europe during that 1942. So any victory would 
be “strictly soviet”, with all of “its implications”. It was of the highest importance 
to “solve the differences and to sign a long-term deal with the Russians”. That did 
not mean that Eden ignored his suspicions about the Soviet Union however. He 
simply  thought  that  such  a  deal  would  “eliminate  Russian  pretexts,  which  are 
quite numerous at the moment”
37. 
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Despite  Churchill’s  hesitation  in  the  matter,  Eden  was  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  this  step so  in  the  following  weeks  he  worked  to  convince  the  other 
Cabinet members. Unexpectedly however, the Soviets increased their demands. They 
required that after the  war  Romania and Finland  would sign a secret protocol that 
enabled the Red Army to build military bases on their territories. Officially this would 
be backed by a treaty of mutual friendship and cooperation. Even Oliver Harvey, who 
worked with Cadogan at the Secretary of the Foreign Office, and who was an ardent 
believer  in  the  cooperation  with  the  Soviets,  opposed  this  latest  demand.  When 
Molotov arrived the next spring in London to sign the treaty, Harvey will state that 
such  a  demand  would  mean  in  practice  handing  those  countries  to  Moscow.  He 
recalled that the  Baltic States suffered a similar  fate after signing such treaties in 
1940
38. But the real opponent  was Cadogan. As  his colleague, Orme Sargeant,  he 
wanted to build a common front with Turkey and Russia together, Britain acting as a 
mediator.  Unlike  the  British  ambassador  in  Russia,  Sir  Stafford  Cripps,  Cadogan 
wasn’t too sympathetic  towards Russian  needs and interests however.  He saw the 
Balkan area as just secondary theatre where British agents would create problems and 
distractions for the Germans. If there were war between Britain and these countries, 
those agents would have a hard time accomplishing their tasks
39. In this matter he had 
the support of Churchill. They both wanted to delay the territorial issue until the end, 
unlike Eden, who as Cadogan said, “was ready to throw all principles to the wind”, 
which  would upset the Americans
40. On the other hand, Churchill did  not  want to 
alienate the Soviets. The fear that Stalin would sign a separate peace treaty with Hitler 
stayed with him for years.  
Yet the British Prime-Minister  had other concerns on  his  mind at that time; 
during the crucial week of 20-27 of December 1941 there was the final attempt on 
behalf of the American government to find a peaceful resolution on its conflict with 
Japan. These last propositions were quite hard and Churchill was aware that Japan 
was likely to reject them. We have no real evidence to support that Churchill openly 
said that war as imminent, but he must have thought it. He could suspect that America 
would join the war on Nazi Germany and that would spare him of any commitment 
with the Soviets. This is one  reason  why the delayed the talks with Stalin and  he 
carefully  avoided  any  agreement.  Eden’s  instructions  for  the  Moscow  trip  were 
handed to  him only on December 4 1941 and Churchill  was careful to say to the 
American ambassador, Winant, that Eden’s only task was to discuss common plans in 
the war. Eden had no prerogatives to sign any territorial treaty and he would have to 
convince Stalin to uphold the Atlantic Charter and its principles. The only discussion 
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on the future of Europe he was authorized to carry was that of disarming Germany 
and the possibility that small states would form federations
41. 
By the time Eden had his first round of negotiations with Stalin and Molotov 
on  December  16  1941,  the  global  situation  was  very  much  different;  the  German 
offensive on Moscow had been halted and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor meant 
that Germany  had to face the  might of the  U.S.A. in the  near future. As so, even 
though Eden had to give the soviets the bad news about the suspending of shipments 
in the near future, Stalin had his own concerns. He needed to get the British to sign an 
alliance with clear territorial clauses and he needed it very soon before the American 
contribution  to  the  war  effort  would  outweigh  his.  But  Eden  was  unmovable;  he 
wouldn’t  sign  the  proposed  document  and  all  the  basis  he  had  to  offer  was  the 
postponement of territorial talks until the end of the conflict with the Axis
42. 
On  his  side,  Churchill  did  discuss  these  events  with  American  president, 
Franklin  Roosevelt, during  the  Arcadia Conference, in January 1942.  Both agreed 
that territorial discussions would nullify the Charter and its moral standards; the U.S. 
media  would strongly oppose it
43. Yet some members of the  British Cabinet  were 
making strong demands for the appeasement of the Soviets. Halifax, now the British 
ambassador in the U.S. discussed this with Summer Welles soon after taking office. 
All  that  he  obtained  was  the  promise  that  the  American  ambassador  in  Moscow, 
William  H.  Standley,  would  open  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Personally, 
Roosevelt was convinced that Stalin didn’t trust the British because they “didn’t live 
up to their promises
44; he was sure he could appease the Soviets without giving in on 
the issue of territorial discussions. 
On the British side however Churchill was beginning to lose the battle with the 
Foreign  Office.  The  War  Cabinet  members  as  well  were  convinced  that  the 
cooperation,  both  during  and  after  the  war,  between  Britain  and  Soviet  Russia 
depended on the issue of mutual trust and security. They recommended reaching a 
compromise  on  the  issue  of  the  borders.  If  not,  at  least  agree  the  idea  of  Soviet 
military  bases  in  Finland  and  Romania
45.  Eventually  Britain  would  agree  to  an 
alliance treaty that recognized the Soviet borders of June 22 1941, with the exception 
of the one with Poland
46.  
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As  for  the  war  declaration,  the  matter  was  resolved  with  significant  speed. 
Earlier that year Britain had issued an ultimatum to Finland, Hungary and Romania to 
withdraw their troops and support for the Wehrmacht. In the case of Romania, the 
document was sent through the American Minister, Gunther, since Britain had broken 
relations. Romania did not respond in time and so the following message was issued 
by the Foreign Office on the 6
th of December 1941: 
“On 29 November, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom sent the 
Romanian Government through the US minister a message according to which if, by 
5 December, the Romanian Government did not cease military operations and did not 
withdraw effectively from any active participation in the hostilities against the USSR, 
His Majesty’s Government would have no option than to declare the existence of a 
state  of  war  between  the  two  countries.  Since  the  Romanian  Government  has  not 
responded to this message and since, according to the information available to His 
Majesty’s Government there is no indication that the Romanian Government intends 
to accept the conditions mentioned above, a state of war will exist between the two 
countries from 12.01 Greenwich Mean Time on 7 December
47”. 
Romanian-American diplomatic relations seemed to follow a similar direction 
with the one exception: the U.S. did not declare war immediately. Between June 22 
1941-2
nd  of  June  1942  Gunther  tried  to  play  a  significant  role  in  the  Romanian 
political life despite the fact that his position was rapidly deteriorating. He maintained 
contacts with opposition leaders, especially Iuliu Maniu. But, as a further proof that 
Washington  was  contemplating  more  decisive  actions,  he  was  soon  instructed  to 
gather information on  Romanian oil equipment,  which  would be sent to  London
48. 
The  U.S.  was  subordinating  relations  with  Romania  to  the  more  important  issue: 
helping the British war effort. 
In the first half of 1942 Romania  had to engage  more troops on the Eastern 
Front. Germany had suffered huge losses in the previous winter at Moscow and the 
Russian counteroffensive even threatened to tear the line apart. As a consequence, for 
the  next  offensive  in  the  summer  on  1942  the  German  High  Command  (O.K.H.) 
required  the  participation  of  greater  allied  forces.  That  was  especially  true  in  the 
south, where the main thrust would take place. For the attack on Stalingrad and the 
Caucasus Germany demanded the commitment of  numerous Romanian divisions
49. 
By the time the American field agents and diplomats identified these new Romanian 
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forces Romania had taken the step of declaring open war, alongside of Hungary in 
December 1942. It was a decision taken because of increasing German pressure, of 
course. Marshall Antonescu did not consider the U.S. an enemy; when the American 
charge,  Webb  Benton  came  to  say  goodbye  to  his  friend  Mihai  Antonescu,  the 
Romanian Foreign Minister made a remarkable statement by saying that “Romania 
will commit no aggression against the United States”
50. The American response didn’t 
arrive immediately. The U.S. would declare war on Romania and the other German 
minor allies on the 2
nd of June 1942. 
 
ROMANIA AND THE LOCATION THE “SECOND FRONT” 
 
Relations in the Allied camp were even from the onset affected in some way or 
another by the issue of the “second front”. The idea was to support the Red Army by 
opening  a  second  front  against  the  Germans,  but  where  and  when?  It  had  to  be 
somewhere in Western Europe, of course and it had to be an amphibious operation. In the 
beginning it seemed that there was a chance for a common position between American 
and British planers. At least as 1942 was concerned, it was imperative to draw German 
forces  away  from  Russia, especially,  after in  the  spring,  their  offensive  was  picking 
momentum.  At  that  time,  and  this  is  true  for  1943  as  well,  Stalin  didn’t  have  any 
preferences; Any landing would suit him just fine as long as it accomplished the goal of 
forcing the Germans to relocate some of their divisions away from the Eastern Front. 
Roosevelt proved to be a fervent supporter for a landing as soon as possible to avoid the 
unsettling prospect of a separate German-soviet peace treaty. America had to make a 
move in 1942 to claim participation at the peace conference since at that time Britain and 
particularly Soviet Russia were carrying the war for the Allies. The first real talk about the 
second  front  took  place  with  Molotov,  during  his visit  in  Washington  in  May  1942. 
Roosevelt took the opportunity to assure the Soviet Foreign Deputy that he intends to 
open a second front later that year. More so, in the common statement it is specified that 
the operation will be directed against Europe, even though the President was aware that 
the British side wanted to invade Axis North Africa
51. 
In fact for the first two year of cooperation, the U.S. War Department officials 
insisted on their British counterparts for an early attack against “fortress Europe”. For 
the American side the Soviets were bearing the brunt of the German war machine and 
they had to be helped soon or else Stalin would admit a peace with Hitler. So in 1942-
1943  American  planning  services  emphasized  the  need  to  support  the  Soviet  war 
effort and the main way of doing that was to cross the English Channel as soon as 
possible
52. But the British side had its own plans and from the beginning we have the 
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so-called “the Great Strategic Debate”: the C.C.S. (Combined Chiefs of State) was 
witness to some strong arguments about where and when to attack the Germans. The 
British, Churchill most of all, wanted a flexible approach and an offensive against the 
enemy’s  weakest  link  –  Italy  and  the  Mediterranean  and  then  the  Balkans.  The 
American Chiefs of Staff, with George Marshall at their lead, supported a crushing 
blow  in  Northern  France  as  soon  as  possible.  At  their  very  first  meeting  in 
Washington in the  winter of 1941, Churchill scored an important victory over  his 
friend, Roosevelt: in the common statement of the meeting we find the location of the 
next Allied target, North Africa: 
“[…] In 1942, the methods of wearing down Germany’s resistance will be[…] 
ever increasing air bombardment by British and American forces […] assistance to 
Russia’s offensive by all available means […] (and operations) the main object (of 
which) will be gaining possession of the whole Northern African coast […] It does 
not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except 
on the Russian front, will be possible […] (but) in 1943, the way may be clear for a 
return to the continent across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by 
landings in Western Europe […]”
53. 
The fact that Churchill managed to squeeze in the Balkans as a potential new 
front for the Allies was an important accomplishment for him. This proved that, at least 
in the beginning, the British had the upper hand in this dispute thanks to their superior 
logistics  and  their  greater  experience.  Later  on  however,  this  would  change 
dramatically. Still, for the moment Roosevelt didn’t give up on the idea of helping 
Soviet Russia by means of a direct attack on “fortress Europe” that same year. Through 
two long telegrams to Churchill on March 7 and 9 he formulated his strategy: 
“[…] I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new 
front  this  summer,  certainly  for  air  and  raids  […]  And  even  if  though  losses  will 
doubtless be great, such losses will be compensated by at least equal German losses and 
by compelling (the) Germans to divert large forces of all kinds from Russian fronts”
54. 
Churchill resisted these advances and there were no Allied landings in France 
in 1942. But there was a moderate success in Tunisia and although the Axis forces 
there would be removed only after 6 months, in the spring on 1943, this meant that 
the Allied airpower could now hit Italy and Central Europe. But even as the German 
forces were still in Tunisia, in December 1942 the dispute was reheated. General Alan 
Brooke  insisted  that  the  Allies  should  continue  on  the  “Mediterranean”  path  and 
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should attack Italy in the summer. He thought that the conditions for an invasion of 
France were not met. It was necessary that the Germans suffer a series of crippling 
blows to soften their potential. On the other hand, Italy was vulnerable, both military 
and politically. A bombing campaign would sap its morale and a beachhead there 
would bring Allied bombers in range of Ploiesti, where the Axis oil reserves rested. 
Furthermore,  with  Italy  eliminated,  the  Allies  could  attack  the  shipments  in  the 
Aegean and cut Germany’s chrome supplies from Turkey
55. 
After the defeat and the expulsion of the Axis forces in Northern Africa, the 
third  Washington  Conference,  codename  Trident,  was  held.  The  same  Brooke 
continued to plea for taking the offensive into Sicily and then mainland Italy. Beyond 
the obvious gains – taking Italy out of the war, this course of action would enable the 
now  huge  Allied  Air  Force  to  engage  Romanian  oil  targets  with  increased 
efficiency
56.  Trident,  which  started  on  May  11  1943,  masked  for  some  time  the 
decreasing  influence  the  British  had  on  Allied  affairs.  The  decision  was  made  to 
continue  down  the  path  wanted  by  Churchill  and  his  staff:  the  next  Allied  target 
would be Italy. It seemed at first that this was a major British success
57. Yet again 
they managed to convince their partners of the justness of their reasoning. At a closer 
look we can see this was not the case; the whole of North Africa was indeed in Allied 
hands. This meant increased security for the shipping in the Atlantic and the losses 
during  May  1943  were  just  5%  compared  to  March  that  same  year.  Overall  the 
strategic initiative  was firmly in Allied possession. Still the American build-up in 
Britain  did  not  reach  the  intended  parameters.  In  the  Isles  there  were  only  2 
operational divisions. In Africa on the other hand, there were 9, plus 30 British ones. 
It  was obvious that for the remainder of 1943 the Allies would have to act on the 
Mediterranean theatre of war, much to the disappointment of the Americans. 
As for Romania, Trident marked the determination of the Allied commanders 
to bring the full might of the bombing campaign down on Ploiesti, the site of many of 
Romania’s oil refineries. The decision to start this campaign as Admiral William D. 
Leahy,  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  said,  was  part  of  a  set  of 
measures  designed  to  soften  the  German  resistance  potential  in  preparation  for 
Overlord, the landings in Normandy, which was set to take place in 1944
58. 
After Italy fell, Churchill tried to convince the Americans that the best course 
of action was to prepare an expeditionary force for the Balkans. This time however 
Roosevelt  declined  with  resolution.  At  the  first  Quebec  Conference,  codenamed 
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Quadrant, he  was adamant that all of the Allied resources were to be poured into 
Overlord. By the end of this conference it became apparent that the balance of power 
in the Allied camp was shifting in favour of the Americans. The differences in the 
approach to  war  remained the key to understanding the relations between the two 
partners and at first the British were able to impose their views because they had the 
experience and the logistics. But by 1943 the increasingly greater U.S. financial and 
military contribution began to leave their mark. Britain had a long-standing military 
tradition stretching back to the Napoleonic age that was all about attrition warfare; the 
U.S. on the contrary, were still the adept of a Civil War style decisive hit to win the 
war in one blow. The fact that Overlord remained ironclad meant that America had 
the greater say in the alliance now
59. 
Still, there were signs of cracks even in the American camp. By mid-1943 we can 
see some differences of opinion between the President and Marshall. Even before the 
meeting with Stalin in Teheran, Roosevelt told Marshall that the Soviets might accept 
cooperation in the Balkans if the Allies would commit enough troops there that the 
Germans would be forced to pull divisions away from Russia. Russian forces were just 
sixty miles away from the Polish border and just forty from Bessarabia so for Roosevelt 
the ideas seemed doable. Marshall however found it frightening; this was exactly what 
Churchill had been advocating for 2 years and he and the other American Chiefs of 
Staff had been fighting it all along. Marshall advised Roosevelt not to bring it up in 
Teheran since the British Prime-Minister would pick it up and present it to Stalin as a 
common  Allied  proposal
60.  Which  indeed  happened;  happily  for  Marshall,  Stalin 
refused it bluntly – Eastern Europe would be liberated by the Red Army alone. 
Some early conclusions are in order after this first round of Allied negotiations 
on the role of Eastern Europe in and after the war. Romania, and its neighbours for that 
matter,  did  not  represent  a  priority  for  the  U.S. or  for  Britain.  Still,  the  British  in 
particular could not ignore the fact that Romania was close to Turkey and Greece. So 
throughout 1942-1943 British diplomacy strived to ensure the existence of a “Balkan 
alternative”  to  Overlord.  Although  initially  considered  just a  way of  distracting  the 
Germans  away  from  Russia,  this  British  proposal  had  bigger  ambitions  in  store;  it 
would turn into a full-fledged second front if the Americans would take the bait. They 
did not since American planners were suspicious of British interests to start with. The 
U.S. participation in the Second World War, they announced, was not to be in favour of 
British influence in  Eastern Europe or anywhere. Marshall and his fellow Chiefs of 
Staff had no intention of bringing American troops in this little conflict of influence in 
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Eastern Mediterranean between the British and the Soviets. It had a long standing history 
stretching back to the tsar area and the Americans wanted nothing to do with it
61. 
 
POSTBELIC PLANNING  
 
American planners started to analyze U.S. post-war security only at the end of 
1943. Even then they emphasized the idea of acquiring forward air and naval bases to 
ensure the defence in depth of the American mainland. This was thought as the best 
defence against a new Pearl Harbor. At that point the American studies were quite 
lenient with Soviets demands in Eastern Europe. This would change in the following 
years, but generally speaking, until the end of 1944 there was no major opposition 
against giving the Soviet Union a white check in Eastern Europe
62. In Washington it 
was considered that this appeasement would make Stalin feel safe and he would be 
willing to work together with the West in building the new order after the defeat of 
the  Axis.  It  was  imperative  to  make  the  Soviet  dictator  feel  safe  since  all  of  the 
assessments revealed that the U.S.S.R. will become the  greatest land power in the 
world  at  the  end  of  the  war.  The  Department  of  State  regarded  Romania  and  the 
whole of Eastern Europe only in connection with the Soviet Russia. As early as 1942, 
G-2, the U.S. Military  Information Division, warned that the Soviet Union  will be 
able  to  defeat  Germany  and  will,  most  likely,  communize  the  whole  of  Eastern 
Europe.  American  planners  were  not  oblivious  to  the  dangers  presented  by  these 
prospects, but Russia’s contribution was vital in defeating Germany. More so, Britain 
was undoubtedly on the decline, so it was imperative to convince the Soviet leaders to 
continue to cooperate after the war for the security of the world
63. 
Both  G-2  and  J.S.S.C.  (Joint  Strategic  Survey  Committee),  the  last  being 
formed by Roosevelt, considered Britain a second rate power, its influence being a 
thing of the past. Since the Army was insisting on securing Soviet help for the war 
with  Japan  after  the  defeat  of  Germany  in  Europe,  J.S.S.C.  proposed  a  list  of 
measures  for  the  relations  with  Moscow.  Among  those,  the  emphasize  rested  on 
“acceptance of the fact that after that defeat Russia will be in a military position to 
impose whatever territorial settlements it desires in Central Europe and the Balkans”, 
and  on  the  idea  that  “the  great  importance  to  the  United  States  of  Russia’s  full 
participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany as essential to the 
prompt and crushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great 
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Britain”
64.  These  conclusions  were  approved  by  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  by  the 
President himself and were the basis on which he conducted the negotiations at Yalta.  
In the end,  for  Washington the future of Eastern Europe seemed sealed; the 
postwar  world  would  be  dominated  by  just  two  powers:  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet 
Union. Britain was on a down slope economically. Although J.S.S.C. and G-2 would 
say  it  openly  a  year  after  that,  they  delivered  their  conclusions  as  early  as  1943. 
J.S.S.C. also warned at that time that any Allied military operation in Eastern Europe 
would  only  raise  suspicions  in  Moscow  and  would  pull  the  U.S.  in  the  influence 
contest  taking  place  there  between  the  Soviets  and  the  British.  American  military 
planners wanted from their diplomats to guarantee to the Soviets a free card in the 
affairs of Eastern Europe and even in the Balkans. Still some pressure groups, mostly 
ethnic, forced Roosevelt to take some actions the Soviets could only interpret as an 
American  encroachment  into  their  sphere  of  influence.  Roosevelt  thought  that  he 
should indeed recognize Soviet control (note that “control” didn’t mean that he would 
be allowed to install communist regimes in these areas), since the Soviet Union had to 
suffer  the  German  aggression  trough  Eastern  Europe.  But  once  Stalin  would  be 
assured he would feel safe and he would be swayed to work closely with Britain and 
America to make the new world a better place. He would relinquish the control he 
once  had over Eastern Europe. That was the plan, but  when Stalin  took unilateral 
decisions about these areas, the President did not understand that it failed. American 
diplomacy was trapped somewhere between the desire to appease Moscow and the 
goal of integrating Eastern Europe in the new world order and organizations and it 
failed  at  both
65.  When  the  more  realistic  Churchill  reached  stroke  a  bargain  with 
Stalin, Roosevelt and the Department of State disapproved it stubbornly. This only 
made Stalin even more suspicious of a plot against the Soviet Union. 
British views of this matter were changing also. It regarded the Eastern Europe-
Balkan area  with some interest, but it focused its attention of Greece and Turkey. 
Practically, any other country could be bargaining chips except these two. That didn’t 
mean that the Foreign Office did not  recognize some importance for Romania. At 
Casablanca  and  other  Allied  Conferences  it  was  the  British  side  that  wanted  to 
include  Romania  both  in  military  operations  and  different  plans  of  reorganization 
after the war. As we pointed out, at the start of the war there were some British plans 
for  the  federalization  of  Eastern  Europe.  The  idea  behind  this  was  that,  after 
Germany’s inevitable defeat,  there  would be a power vacuum in  this region. That 
proved to be disastrous at the end of World War I and Britain didn’t want to repeat 
the mistake. Three new federal actors, one in North, another in Centre and the third in 
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South, would bring stability on the continent as they would be controlled by the Great 
Powers.  Britain  was  ready  to  accept  some  kind  of  Soviet  special  interest  in  the 
Eastern
66. Admiral Roger Bellairs, part of the M.S.C. (Military Subcommittee) wrote 
the first memorandum about this matter and he circulated it at the Foreign Office at 
the end of 1942. The document supported Roosevelt’s idea for “the four policemen” 
that would organize the world after the war; for Eastern Europe it reverted back to an 
older Foreign Office idea to create federations of small states that would work with 
the U.S.S.R. and Britain and that would act as “forts against German penetration”. 
More  importantly,  there  is  phrase  in  the  document  that  states  that  the  “Primary 
responsibility  for  Europe  would  fall  on  Britain  and  the  U.S.S.R  for  geographical 
reasons  and  ‘by  virtue  of  the  Anglo-Soviet  Treaty,  which…however,  need  not 
preclude arrangements being  made by Great Britain in Western Europe and by the 
Soviet Government in Eastern Europe in order to control the foreign policies of the 
local Powers”. The War Cabinet, through Eden, approved of this plan on November 
27 1942 as “the present basis of our foreign policy”
67. 
The analysis on the Soviet demands at the end of 1941 made British analysts 
very sceptical about Moscow’s good will and intentions. If in London there were the 
tendencies to accept with some compensation the idea of Soviet special interests in 
Eastern  Europe,  the  British  agents  and  diplomats  in  the  field  disapproved  it.  Sir 
Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow, told Eden in his report that 
the Russians are not to be trusted and they will not accept any Western intrusion in 
their influence zone. Kerr thought that the Soviets were interested in securing their 
Western border and they would push it westwards as much as they are allowed to
68. 
The  same  conclusion  was  reached  by  the  head  of  the  S.O.E.  (Special  Operations 
Executive) in Moscow, General Hill. He put forward a memorandum about Russia’s 
intentions after the war in which he specified that: 
“1) General. Russia will insist on incorporating Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Bessarabia. No compromise will be accepted with these countries. Post-war Russia will 
need almost anything it can gets its hands on in order to rebuild its devastated territories 
[…] Reconstruction will be their main goal and it could take some time. For now they 
show no sign of wanting to install communist regimes in Poland or Germany”
69.  
Of course, the General’s opinion was not the only one; the clashes between the 
Foreign Office and the S.O.E. are documented. What is certain is that at the time of 
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this  document  –  November  1943  –  there  was  the  common  perception  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  wanted  to  ensure  its  security  and  nothing  else.  Stalin  was  thought  to  be 
shrewd enough to understand his position and negotiate “Great Powers” style his own 
influence zone after the war was won. Still, General Hill warned: 
“[…]  In  my  opinion,  no  matter  how  hard  Russia  will  bleed  until  it  obtains 
victory, it will be there at the conference table whether we like it or not, relying on a 
huge and experienced land army, on well equipped and trained tank forces and on a 
considerable  air  power.  Soviet  Russia  is  the  only  <European>  power  ready  and 
willing to  financially support a permanent army. Those who think (like America’s 
representatives) that at the end of the war the Russian generals will take action in to 
their own hands and force a clash with the government and will topple the current 
Soviet leadership are living in a fantasy land. The Red Army would never do that. 
What Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Turkey think about the Soviet 
military domination does not matter. What will Britain and the U.S. do at the Peace 
Conference and afterwards does and that is the only factor that will determine how 
the Soviet army will be used by the regime”
70. 
American  planners  had,  by  now,  reached  similar  glooming  conclusions. 
Admiral Leahy thought by 1944 that the Soviet power had grown at a phenomenal 
rate, but he still nurtured hopes for cooperation
71. At the same time, in a J.C.S. report 
in that same summer, it  was told that quite clearly after the war the Soviet  Union 
would dominate Central Europe and Nord-East Asia
72.  
The  British  also  circulated  a  lot  of  documents  in  1944  mapping  the  future 
Soviet moves in diplomacy and power projection. In march 1944 the Foreign Office 
Research Department theorized that Soviet Russia’s “desire to prevent any risk of a 
revival of the German menace in Central and South-Eastern Europe would lead to the 
exertion  of  powerful  influence  upon  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Romania, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia”
73. Of all of these countries the British officials realized they 
could stop this process only in the latter. This assessment came after the notorious 
conflict between Eden and Sargent on how to react to increasing Soviet pressure in 
Eastern Europe. Sargent had analyzed the reports from all over the region as well as 
from the South-Eastern Department which was the Foreign Office’s structure tasked 
with supplying event analysis and political prognosis in that area. The head of the 
Department, Howard, had suggested that an Anglo-American military presence was 
required to counter Soviet hegemonic tendencies. E. M. Rose, another key figure of 
the  Department,  claimed  that  the  Soviets  will  use  the  abundant  ethnic  problems 
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present there in order to facilitate their penetration
74. 
The issue of the second front was finally resolved at the Teheran Conference. 
Roosevelt brought the problem to the table suggesting that an Allied landing in the 
Balkans could link up with Tito’s partisans and help the Soviets break the German 
line.  Churchill  was  enthusiastic.  This  was  his  brain-child  -  an  Allied  offensive 
sweeping through Bulgaria and Romania would safeguard British interests in Greece 
and would put them at a better bargaining position at the peace conference. Stalin was 
opposed however and he was well prepared to block off any attempt. He claimed that 
this plan would only serve to divert resources and men away from the main strike in 
France.  His  position  is  shockingly  similar  to  the  one  J.C.S.  supported  before  the 
conference. Roosevelt had  no option but to endorse it by the end of that  meeting. 
Overlord was on as the main Allied push for 1944
75. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is fair to say that Romania played only a minor role in the big scheme of 
things  that  was  the  Great  Alliance,  as  Churchill  called  it,  between  Soviet  Russia, 
Great Britain and the United States. But these smaller matters tend to mask bigger 
strategic conflicts and the case of Romania is no exception. Bucharest found itself in 
the  middle of a wider struggle for dominance that stretched from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic between Britain and the U.S.S.R. American interests were limited in the area 
at the beginning years, but as the war progressed it became obvious that American 
diplomacy will play an important role in the shaping of the post-war world. In the 
course of the Second World War Eastern Europe was included in a series of plans by 
both the British and the Americans but only the former truly realised the danger that 
the Soviet Union posed for a united Europe.  
It  could  be  argued  that  the  lack  of  commitment  on  the  part  of  Washington 
allowed  the  Soviets  to  extend  their  influence  on  the  whole  region.  On  a  more 
thorough analysis this idea becomes less clear; while America seemed determined to 
follow  the  “Big  Four  policemen”  concept  for  post-war  security  (especially  under 
President  Roosevelt),  it  didn’t  however  ignored  the  obvious  fight  for  influence  in 
Eastern  Europe  between  Britain  and  the  U.S.S.R.  American  policy-makers  just 
assumed  Stalin  will  be  reasonable  and  agree  to  a  certain  relaxation  and 
democratisation of the area after the war’s end. Here lie the seeds of the emerging 
Cold War when it became clear that this was not the case, and Romania was on the 
forefront during the next years after 1947. 
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